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 Prior research (Wells, 1974; MacMillan, 1985, 1987; Shepherd, 1999) has 
focused on examining VCs’ decision making at the pre-investment stage.  Few studies 
have investigated VCs’ financing decisions at the post-investment stage, and the 
differences between investment and reinvestment.  Some scholars claimed that VCs are 
more likely to provide a venture with initial funding than subsequent financing (Dean & 
Guglierano, 1990).  Others argued the opposite (Ryan, 1994; Guler, 2003).  My 
dissertation seeks to answer this question empirically.  I surveyed 40 VCs either in person 
or over the phone, and asked them to assess how some new incremental information will 
affect the likelihood that they will invest in a venture at the pre-investment vs. post-
investment stage.  The results have demonstrated that VCs assess the same positive 
information more positively at the post-investment stage compared to the pre-investment 
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 Venture capitalists (hereafter VCs) use a wide range of investment criteria for 
screening and evaluating entrepreneurs’ business proposals (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1981; 
1984; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Shepherd, 1999).  Starting in the early 1970s (Hoffman, 
1972; Wells, 1974; Benoit, 1974), scholars began to carry out studies seeking to identify 
VCs’ investment criteria, and to establish their relative importance for VCs’ financing 
decisions. 
 In the 1990s, several researchers have proposed that VCs utilize relevant concepts 
derived from the economics and strategy literature as their investment criteria (Hall & 
Hofer, 1993; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000).  For instance, Shepherd (1999) has 
demonstrated that VCs consistently apply notions advanced in the IO economics 
literature such as” the timing of entry;” “the lead time” (how long a venture will maintain 
its leadership before competitors could catch up to it); “key success factors stability,” and 
“industry-related competence” for screening and evaluating entrepreneurs’ business 
proposals. 
 Although prior researchers have thoroughly examined VCs’ investment decisions 
at the pre-investment stage (when VCs decide whether to provide a venture with initial 
financing) there are few studies dedicated to VCs’ investment decisions at the post-
investment stage (when VCs decide whether to provide a venture with additional 
financing).  Scholars of VCs’ post-investment decisions have also expressed different 
views regarding the question whether VCs are more likely to provide a venture with 
initial or additional financing.  Some scholars have claimed that VCs are unlikely to 
continue investing in the same company since they want to diversify their investments 
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(Dean and Giglierano, 1990)   Conversely, others researchers (Ryan, 1998; Guler, 2003) 
have argued that VCs are more likely to provide additional than initial financing to a 
venture in which they have previously invested as they succumb to escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1976).   
 In this thesis, I have followed prior scholars (Sandberg et al., 1988; Shepherd, 
1999) who have proposed that VCs utilize relevant concepts from the strategy and 
economics literatures in their decision making.  In the same vein, I have isolated thirteen 
concepts from the strategy and economics literatures (for instance, “sector dominance,” 
“strategic flexibility,” “product-market strategy,” “competitor delayed response,” 
“competitor retaliation”), and argued that VCs employ these concepts as their investment 
criteria both at the pre-investment and post-investment stage albeit weight them 
differently.  
 The research question addressed in this dissertation is as follows: do VCs assess 
positive information regarding the same investment criteria more positively at the post-
investment stage compared to the pre-investment stage, and, consequently, are more 
likely to provide a venture with additional financial support than to initially fund a 
venture? 
 While indebted to prior research, this thesis is distinct both theoretically and 
methodologically.  First, I have derived a variety of pertinent concepts from the strategy 
and financial economics literatures, and have established that VCs in point of fact utilize 
these concepts as their investment criteria both at the pre-investment and post-investment 
stage.   
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 These investment criteria are: 1) sector dominance in a sufficiently large and 
rapidly growing market; 2) winning product market strategy; 3) superior business model; 
4) management flexibility, creativity and trustworthiness; 4) management superior 
knowledge and understanding of its sector; 5) great management team; 6) customer 
concern management; 7) customer prompt product endorsement; 8) customer market 
power to make product adoption decisions; 9/ competitor delayed response to a new 
entry; 10) competitor retaliation expected; 11) competitor nonresponse due to own 
problems; and 12) competitor collaboration expected.  Most interviewed VCs confirmed 
that they apply this set of criteria or that it is relevant for analysis of VCs’ investment 
decisions.  
 Second, I have contributed to the discussion as to whether VCs are more likely to 
initially fund a venture or to provide a venture with additional financing (Dean & 
Guglierano, 1990; Steier & Greenwood, 1995, Ryan, 1994; Guler, 2003) by establishing 
that VCs interpret positive information obtained with respect to their investment criteria 
more positively at the post-investment stage than at the pre-investment stage and, hence, 
are more likely to provide a venture with additional financing than to initially fund a 
venture. 
 This study also employs a new data generation methodology.  I asked the 
respondents to evaluate the incremental value of each investment criterion (at the pre-
investment and post-investment stage) after the process of due diligence has been 
completed, and a VC has established that it is 50% likely to provide a venture with 
funding. This has forced VCs to ponder the actual impact of each investment criterion on 
investment. 
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CHAPTER 2: LIERATURE REVIEW 
 Table 1 presents prior studies in terms of their focus, sample, data gathering and 
data analysis.  Table 2 summarizes the main investment criteria utilized by VCs for 
screening and evaluating entrepreneurs’ business proposals.  I will begin with discussing 
Table 1.  Subsequently, I will analyze the information presented in Table 2.  After that, I 
will turn to the results of several studies that have examined the difference between VCs’ 
decision making at the pre-investment and post-investment stage.  A recapitulation of the 
accomplishments and deficiencies of prior research on VCs’ investment criteria will 
follow.  Finally, I will relate this study to prior research, and recapitulate its distinct 
approach. 
Focus 
 Most of the prior studies of VCs’ decision making reported in Table 1 have 
focused on extracting from interviews and surveys of VCs a list of criteria VCs employ to 
evaluate ventures for a possible financing.  In some studies, this objective was combined 
with related goals.  Thus, some researchers have been interested in identifying the main 
stages of the VC investment process (Hoffman, 1972; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Hisrich & 
Fried) and establishing the assortment of investment criteria VCs utilize throughout that 
process.   
 Other researchers have focused on detecting the investment criteria used by most 
successful VC firms (McMillan et al., 1987).  Some scholars sought to establish whether 
VCs in their home country utilize the same investment criteria as those employed by VCs 
in North America (Rah, 1994, Zutschi et al., 1999).  A number of studies have focused on 
a particular market such as high-technology (Bachher, 2000).  Others have zeroed in on 
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some aspects of VCs’ thought process, for instance, the role of intuition in VCs’ decision 
making (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Hall, 1989). 
      Sample 
 Scholars have assembled their samples via interviews, surveys or a combination 
of these two methods.  The reported studies have used as their unit analysis a survey 
filled out by an individual VC; a business proposal evaluated by a VC; or a VC’s 
“thought unit,” i.e. a VC’s comments with respect to an analyzed business proposal (Hall, 
1989).  Many samples have been small.  Well (1974) has interviewed 10 VCs at 7 VC 
firms.  Hall (1989) has interviewed 4 VCs.  Kaplan & Stromberg (2000) have interviewed 
10 VCs’ 58 investments (in this case, “investment” was the unit of analysis) in 40 
companies. 
 Kumar et al. (2003) has interviewed 11 VCs from India.  Silva (2004) has focused 
on one VC firm in Portugal (he has used the method of participating observation).  
Muzyka et al. (1996) have interviewed 73 VCs (among three scholars) and Rah et al. 
(1994) have interviewed 74 VCs.  MacMillan et al. (1985) have only interviewed 14 VCs 
but surveyed 102 VCs.  Most samples have been based on 30 to 70 interviews and/or 
surveys.  
Data Gathering 
 Most studies have followed the same sequence of steps for data gathering.  At the 
first step, scholars approached a few VCs for a preliminary interview.  On the basis of 
such interviews, researchers have compiled lists of VCs’ investment criteria.  Conversely, 
some have derived VCs’ investment criteria from the relevant concepts in strategy and 
economics (Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000). 
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 The second step was to classify the criteria into groups such as “management 
competence” or “product-market criteria.”  At the third step, researchers usually have 
tested on a larger sample the investment criteria they had compiled via initial interviews 
of VCs or had derived from the relevant concepts advanced in the strategy and economics 
literature.   
 Researchers have typically contacted several VCs in their area to conduct initial 
interviews.  Scholars have not discussed how they secured these initial interviews.  One 
can venture a guess that they have directly approached some prominent VCs in their 
community.   
 At the third stage of data gathering, scholars frequently mailed questionnaires to 
all members of a VC association (national or regional).  The response rate was typically 
about 20%.  Most scholars used a combination of interviews and surveys.  Some only 
conducted surveys.  A few researchers (Hall, 1988; Hall & Hofer, 1993) have conducted 
a live observation: they asked VCs to assess proposals in their presence and comment on 
them. 
Data Analysis 
 Originally, researchers asked VCs to assess their investment criteria on a four-
point scale and subsequently rank ordered their aggregate appraisals (Hoffman, 1972; 
Wells, 1974).  Later, scholars began to use factor analysis and cluster analysis (Tyebjee 
& Bruno, 1981; 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985, 1987) to establish whether their proposed 
classification of investment criteria into groups could be supported.  In most cases, factor 
analysis revealed that VCs have applied their investment criteria in a different way than it 
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has been originally hypothesized by scholars (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan, 1985; 
1987). 
 Sandberg et al. (1986) and Hall (1989) have criticized prior research on VCs’ 
investment criteria based on VCs’ self-reports due to its common bias: overstating the 
number of investment criteria and understating the importance of the key investment 
criteria.  Respectively, Sandberg et al (1986), Hall (1989) and Hall and Hofer (1993) 
have begun conducting studies based on verbal protocol analysis: they asked VCs to 
think aloud while assessing real proposals in order to capture VCs’ underlying “thought 
units.”  
 Riquelme and Rickards (1992) have censured verbal protocol analysis for being 
too subjective.  They have proposed applying conjoint analysis to reveal the importance 
of each investment criterion by contrasting them one to another in pairs.  A large group of 
researchers has consistently employed conjoint analysis to identify VCs’ “in-use” as 
opposed to “espoused” investment criteria and, thus, overcome the limitations of VC self-
reports (Muzyka et al., 1996: Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1998).   
The Main Investment Criteria Identified in Prior Research 
 Next, I will summarize the main investment criteria identified in prior research 
(Table 2). 
Top Management Team (TMT) 
 Prior studies have identified numerous management-related investment criteria 
that VCs utilize to decide whether to provide a venture with initial funding.  Most studies 
have shown that VCs evaluate whether senior management is competent.  Some scholars 
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(Wells, 1974) differentiated among management functional skills: general, marketing, 
financial and manufacturing.  Others mostly discussed management expertise and 
capabilities (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). 
 Scholars have argued that VCs often choose not just competent but also seasoned 
managers (Robinson, 1987; Knight, 1994) on the basis of their track record, experience 
and references from prior places of employment.  In addition, scholars have demonstrated 
that VCs consider management psychological characteristics and cognitive capabilities: 
perseverance, commitment, attention to detail, and high risk tolerance (Wells, 1974 
Kumar, 2003). 
  Separately, many studies have discovered that VCs are concerned about the 
ability of senior management to act as leaders and be recognized as leaders by others 
(Robinson, 1987; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2000).  According to some studies, VCs typically 
assess the quality of a management team, for instance, VCs prefer when a management 
team is balanced, i.e. it is composed of people with different functional backgrounds and 
skills (Muzyka et al., 1996, Bachher, 2000). 
Market and Market Growth 
 Prior studies have revealed that VCs are primarily concerned whether there is 
sufficient access to a market targeted by a venture (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984); whether a 
venture satisfies an existing market need or stimulates a new need in an existing market 
(MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987); whether a market is sufficiently large so that a venture 
can become profitable and/or whether a market is growing fast enough (Muzyka et al., 
1996). 
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 In addition, Shepherd (1999) and Shepherd et al. (2000) have derived several 
concepts regarding market conditions from the economics literature, and have 
demonstrated that VCs utilize such criteria as “key success factor stability” (VCs 
examine if requirements necessary for achieving success in the market change slowly or 
rapidly). 
Product 
 Prior studies have established that VCs carefully evaluate the quality of a 
venture’s product using the following criteria: is the product unique or sufficiently 
differentiated compared to competitors’ offerings (Muzyka et al., 1996)?  Is the product 
proprietary (MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998)?  Does a 
functioning prototype of a product exist (MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987)?  Will a product 
allow a venture to obtain a competitive advantage due to its apparent superiority over the 
competitors’ products or services (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Zacharakis and Meyer, 
1998)? 
Risk 
 Scholars have established that in evaluating prospective investments VCs identify 
various types of risk they may need to tackle with regard to a particular venture.  Thus, 
MacMillan et al. (1985) have identified five types of risk typically examined by VCs: 1/ 
competitive risk; 2/ bail out risk; 3/ investment risk; 4/ management risk; 5/ 
implementation risk.  MacMillan et al. (1987) outlined five similar types of risk: 1/ 





 Numerous studies have demonstrated that VCs are extremely concerned whether 
the projected returns from investment in a venture will be sufficient to justify a venture’s 
funding (Poindexter, 1975).  At the same time, prior research has indicated that VCs do 
not quite trust entrepreneurs’ “overoptimistic” projections regarding their future returns, 
and pay more attention to the market growth rate and whether a product satisfies a market 
need (MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987; Zacharakis, 1995). 
Exit 
 Prior studies have shown that VCs look into their conceivable exit choices before 
they invest (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  Since VCs’ funds have a limited life span 
(typically, up to ten years), VCs are concerned whether they will be able to liquidate their 
investment on time (MacMillan et al., 1985).  Thus, VCs may or may not fund a venture 
depending on their estimates of the likelihood and timing of certain anticipated exit 
alternatives (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2000). 
Deal 
 Another important consideration for VCs is the quality of the deal.  According to 
prior research, VCs may like a venture, but will invest in it only if they are guaranteed a 








 MacMillan et al. (1985; 1987) have first shown that VCs separately analyze a 
venture’s strategy (for instance, its positioning vis-à-vis competitors) as one of their 
investment criteria.  Other researchers have also observed VCs using this investment 
criterion (Muzyka et al., 1996). 
Customer 
 Most prior studies of VCs’ investment criteria have not mentioned the customer’s 
approval as a separate investment criterion.  Instead, prior scholars have demonstrated the 
role of market acceptance of product (MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987).  Some new studies, 
however, have emphasized that VCs separately analyze the customer’s perspective (Silva, 
2004), that is, whether customers in a particular sector will be likely to endorse a product 
and whether senior management has developed a true understanding of their prospective 
customers. 
Competition 
 Prior studies have established that VCs carefully assess the extent of competitive 
threat in a sector before they decide to invest.  Thus, MacMillan et al. (1987) have 
discovered that two underlying factors have been consistent predictors of VCs’ financing 
decisions: a) market acceptance of a new product; and b) the degree of competitive threat.  
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990) have pointed out that VCs consider the odds that a venture 
will be able to hold off competition and whether competitors would immediately target a 
venture as soon as it enters a market sector.  Zacharakis (1995) has determined that VCs 
take into account the number and relative strength of competitors in a target market.  
Shepherd et al. (2000) have demonstrated that management competence and the degree of 
 12
competitive rivalry appear to be two most important criteria in VCs’ evaluations of new 
ventures.  
Studies of VCs’ Post-Investment Funding Decisions 
 Scholars of investment criteria expressed different opinions as to whether VCs are 
likely to continue funding the ventures they have previously selected for financing.  
Stevenson et al. (1987) in a Monte Carlo simulation showed that VC firms investing in 
multiple rounds generate higher returns than VCs investing in one round only, and, 
hence, proposed that VCs will be likely to continue financing the ventures they have 
funded.   
 Dean (1988), and Dean and Baksi (1990) pointed out that VCs need to compare 
first-time/early round opportunities and multiple-investment/later round opportunities and 
choose those that promise the highest return.  Dean and Giglierano (1990) and Steier and 
Greenwood (1995) have shown that it may be difficult for a startup that has obtained 
initial financing in the first round to raise more money for further rounds because their 
initial investors may be tapped out, and since a great number of VC firms “manage 
uncertainty (a) by spreading funds across ventures and (b) not funding subsequent 
rounds.”   
 Conversely, Ryan (1994), Guler (2003) and Birmingham et al (2003) have argued 
that VCs exhibit escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976) with respect to their ventures 
and waste resources by providing new rounds of financing to underperforming portfolio 
companies.  Thus, prior researchers have expressed contrary opinions as to whether VCs 




The Accomplishments of Prior Research: 
 Prior research has identified a number of key investment criteria used by VCs for 
evaluating entrepreneurs’ business proposals, and has established their relative 
importance.  Specifically, prior studies have shown that the size and attractiveness of the 
market (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984); management capabilities and functional skills (Wells, 
1974); the uniqueness of a product or service (Fried & Hisrich, 1994); market acceptance 
of a product and the degree of competitive threat in the marketplace (MacMillan et al., 
1985; 1987: Muzyka et al., 1996) are among the topmost investment criteria in a VC’s 
repertory. 
  Prior research has also developed two contrasting methods of identifying VCs’ 
investment criteria that can be regarded as complementary.  While traditional research 
has established VCs’ investment criteria by way of conducting interviews and surveys of 
VCs (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Muzyka et al., 1996), more recent studies (Shepherd, 
1999; Shepherd et al., 2000) have initially derived concepts relevant to VC investment 
from the economics and strategy literature and then demonstrated that VCs actually 
utilize them as investment criteria.  The second method allows avoiding some biases of 
prior research based on VCs’ self-reports since it applies knowledge from other 
disciplines to improve understanding of VC investment.  Yet this method needs to be 
grounded in study of VCs’ practices.  
 Prior research has also posed an all-important question: it is preferable for VCs to 
continue investing in their existing portfolio companies or to invest in new promising 
ventures (Stevenson et al., 1988)?  Scholars have answered this question differently.  
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Some have argued that VCs may be less likely to provide additional financing to their 
portfolio companies since they could be “tapped out” or may prefer to diversify their 
investments (Steier & Greenwood, 1988; Dean and Guglierano, 1990).  Others have 
demonstrated that VCs tend to invest far too long in their underperforming ventures 
instead of terminating them in a timely fashion since they fall prey to escalation of 
commitment (Ryan, 1998; Guler, 2003). 
 This question has a great significance for VCs.  VCs that fail to continue investing 
in their promising companies and diversify instead into new obscure companies may lose 
considerable profits in the offing.  Similarly, VCs that continue investing in failing 
companies instead of putting their money into new promising ventures risk to lose their 
investment.    
The Deficiencies of Prior Research 
 Prior research has focused on identifying the investment criteria VCs apply at the 
pre-investment stage, and has established their relative importance.  In doing so, previous 
studies have assumed that VCs utilize and prioritize investment criteria at the post-
investment stage in the same way as they do at the pre-investment stage.  However, VCs 
may employ contrasting criteria or prioritize them differently depending on the stage of 
investment.  Indeed, Dean and Guglierano (1990) have shown that VCs are less interested 
in management expertise at the post-investment stage compared to the pre-investment 
stage.   
 Furthermore, instead of continuing to research new investment criteria, scholars 
lately have been testing whether VCs use the investment criteria discovered in prior 
studies (Kumar, 2003).  VCs, however, are likely to change their investment criteria as 
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the market situation changes and as VCs develop more sophisticated analytical tools; 
hence, academic research needs to persistently reexamine VCs’ decision making in its 
evolution.   
 Specifically, VCs these days are more focused on finding future leaders that have 
a potential of seizing dominance in their sector, that exhibit strategic flexibility, and have 
an impressive product-market strategy and business model.  Prior studies have not paid 
much attention to these criteria since in the previous period they were not critical for VC 
financing.  These criteria have become more important after the stock market bubble has 
burst (Hardymon et al., 2006). 
How Does This Dissertation Fit Into the Existing Literature? 
 Following prior studies (Sandberg et al, 1988; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 
2000), I derive a number of relevant concepts from the strategy literature, and test 
whether VCs actually utilize these concepts as their investment criteria both at the pre-
investment and post-investment stage. 
 This dissertation seeks to answer the question posed in prior research: are VCs 
more likely to provide a venture with initial or additional financing?  I approach this 
question empirically by asking VCs to assess how the same information will affect the 
likelihood of their funding a venture at the pre-investment stage vs. post-investment 
stage. 
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 Table 1. Prior Studies’ Focus, Sample, Data Gathering and Analysis. 
 
Author(s) and 
Date Focus Sample Data gathering Data Analysis 




Wells, 1974 VC decision making 10 VCs at 7 VC firms Interviews & 
questionnaires 
 
Qualitative analysis; correlation 
Poindexter, 1975 
 
Efficient markets 91 VCs Questionnaires Ranking scale 
Benoit, 1975 VCs’ investment behavior 22 VCs Questionnaires & 
Interviews 
 
Qualitative analysis; counting 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1981 
Decision making 46 VCs Questionnaires; VCs’ 
evaluations of deals; 
interviews 
 
Counting; Factor analysis 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984 
VC investment activity 41 VC firms Questionnaires 
41 respondents evaluated 
90 proposals 
 














successful VC firms in the 
screening process 
6 VCs (initial interviews) + 
67 VCs evaluated 150 
ventures 
6 structured personal 




Khan, 1987 Noncompensatory 
behavioral decision 
models 
36 VCs VCs’ reports on their 
investments 
Conjunctive and disjunctive 
actuarial models used to model 





Date Focus Sample Data gathering Analysis 
Robinson, 1987 VC firms’ strategies 53 VCs Questionnaires Ranking of mean importance 
scores 









VCs’ decision processes 1 VC; 40 thought units Proposals for evaluation Verbal protocol analysis 
Hall, 1989 VCs’ decision making 4 VCs Interviews in-person or on 
the phone 
 




Intuition in VCs’ decisions 5 VCs (6 proposals)  Repertory grid technique 
Riquelme & 
Rickards, 1992 
Hybrid conjoint analysis 
applied to VCs’ decision 
making 
 
13 VCs Interview Modeling 
Fried & Hisrich, 
1994 
 
VCs’ decision making 18 VCs Interviews Analysis of VCs’ responses 
Rah, Jung, Lee, 
1994 
 
Venture evaluation in 
Korea 
74 VCs  Questionnaires and 
interviews 
Factor analysis and discriminant 
analysis 
Knight, 1994 VCs’ investment criteria: a 




Questionnaires Rankings of responses 
Zacharakis, 1995 
 
The venture capital 
investment decision 
 






Trade-offs in investment 
decisions 
73 VCs Questionnaires and 
interviews 
Conjoint analysis: evaluate 




Date Focus Sample Data gathering Analysis 





VCs’ evaluation criteria 232 business proposals 
received by a VC fund 











31 VCs Questionnaires VCs’ ratings used to establish 







 Assessments of new 
venture strategy and 
profitability 
 
66 VCs representing 47 VC 
firms 
Conjoint decision making 
task administered in person 
or by mail 
Conjoint Analysis 
OLS regression 
Bachher, 2000 VCs’ investment criteria 
in technology-based new 
ventures 
 






How do VCs choose their 
investments? 
10 VC firms; 58 investments 
in 40 companies 
Interviews and surveys. Regression 
Kumar Kaura, 
2003 
VCs’ screening criteria 11 VCs Questionnaires Kendall’s tau-c used to assess 
the association among variables 
(a measure of agreement among 
raters) 
 
Silva, 2004 VCs’ decision making in 
small equity markets 










Table 2. VCs’ Investment Criteria Reported in Prior Studies. 
 
The criteria can be regarded as independent variables, and the decision to invest can be regarded as a dependent variable. (The 
numbers in the cells show the relative importance of each criterion demonstrated in the respective study). 
Definitions of criteria: 
1. TMT – senior management’s capabilities, expertise, commitment, leadership qualities, balance in the TMT.  
2. Market – the attractiveness of the target market. 
3. Market growth – fast sector growth as a prerequisite for investment. 
4. Product – a unique product that meets a distinct market need. 
5. Risk – the types of risk that VCs will need to consider. 
6. Return – required rate of return or level of profitability. 
7. Exit – a VC’s ability to exit a venture in a timely fashion (usually 5 – 7 years). 
8. Deal - the quality of the deal (% of equity and the price of equity purchased). 
9. Strategy – how a venture positions itself vis-à-vis its competitors in a sector. 
10. Customer – whether a venture has a good understanding of its prospective customers. 
11. Competition – the number and relative strength of competitors in a sector. 
 
Studies/Criteria TMT Market Market Growth Product Risk Returns Exit Deal Strategy Customer Competition 
1. Hoffman, 1972 
 2 3  1     
  5 
2. Wells, 1974 
 1 3  2     
   
3. Poindexter, 1975 
 1    3 2  4 
   
4. Benoit, 1975 
 1 3  5  2   
  4 
5. Tyebjee & 
Bruno,1981 
 
3 2   4 1 5  
 
  
6. Tyebjee & 
Bruno, 1984 
 
















 2       
 
 1 
9. Khan, 1987 
 1    2    
  3 
10. Robinson, 1987 
 4 2       








Schweiger, Hofer,  
1988 
 
3 2    4   
 
 1 
13. Hall, 1989 
  1 2      




1        
 
  
15. Riquelme & 
Rickards, 1992 
 
1   2     
 
  
17. Fried & 
Hisrich, 1994 
 
2     3   
 
  
18. Rah, Jung, Lee, 
1994 
 
1 2  3  4      
19. Knight, 1994 
 
1 3  2  4      
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1 2  3  5  6 4   
22. Boocock & 
Woods 1997 
 
5 2   6   4    









1     3     2 
25. Bachher, 2000 
 1 2  3  5      
26. Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2000 
 
 1  2       4 
27. Kumar & 
Kaura, 2003 
 
2 3   1 4      






CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
 In his doctoral dissertation (1998), and a number of subsequent publications 
(1999; 2000), Shepherd has proposed some major changes in conducting research on 
VCs’ investment criteria.  Instead of asking VCs (as prior scholars did) what investment 
criteria they apply to evaluate new ventures Shepherd (1999) has introduced a reverse 
procedure.  Based on the literature in IO economics, he has identified some investment 
criteria that VCs would be likely to use for analyzing entrepreneur’s business proposals, 
and then has demonstrated that VCs employ such criteria via interviews and surveys with 
VCs.    
 Following Shepherd’s (1999) approach, I seek to identify a number of relevant 
variables from the strategy literature that may shed some additional light (compared to 
prior research) on how VCs evaluate their investments.  Based on strategic theories 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996; Grimm, Lee & Smith, 2005) and interviews with VCs 
(Roberts & Barley, 2004; Hardymon et al., 2005) that have recently become available I 
examine the following thematically organized sets of variables: 1/ variables related to a 
venture’s business plan; 2/ variables related to a venture’s management; 3/ variables 
related to a venture’s customers; and finally, 4/ variables related to a venture’s 
competition.  In what follows, I will describe the variables pertaining to each of these 
groups. 
Business Plan Related Investment Criteria 
 In a recent HBS study, Roberts and Barley (2004) posed the following questions 
to top VCs regarding their appraisals of prospective investments: “1) How do you 
evaluate potential venture opportunities?; 2) How do you evaluate the venture’s 
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prospective business model?; 3) What due diligence do you conduct?; 4) What is the 
process through which funding decisions are made?; 5) What financial analyses do you 
perform?; 6) What role does risk play in your evaluation? 7) How do you think about a 
potential exit route?” 
 The interviewed VCs affirmed that a venture’s business model plays an important 
role in their investment decision (Roberts & Barley, 2004).  In a similar vein, other 
scholars have demonstrated the critical importance of a venture’s product market strategy 
for receiving VC support (Muzyka et al., 19896; Hellmann & Puri, 2000).  Product 
market strategy has to do with placing a venture’s product in a fitting market sector and 
adequately positioning it vis-à-vis competitors’ offerings.  Thus, highly innovative 
products may require a different type of positioning (and are more likely to receive VC 
support) compared to conventional products (Hellmann & Puri, 2000).  Business model 
generally relates to a venture’s selection of a suitable sales approach and of an 
appropriate configuration of distribution channels (Roberts & Barley, 2004; Hardymon et 
al., 2006). 
 These “business plan components” (product-market strategy and business model) 
have not been at the forefront of prior research on VCs’ investment criteria although 
MacMillan et al. (1985, 1987) have established that a “venture’s strategy” is one of the 
important criteria VCs apply to evaluate their prospective investments.  However, these 
days there is a much stronger emphasis in the literature (Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Roberts 
& Barley, 2004) on “business plan” categories, and their impact on VCs’ investment 
decision. 
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 The theme of market leadership (or sector dominance) has lately become salient 
in the strategy literature.  Powell (2003; 2005) argued that a firm may become dominant 
even in a perfectly competitive industry and proposed measuring a firm’s leading position 
by the number of its “wins” over competitors.  Shamsie defined sector dominance as “the 
observed pattern on the part of a firm to develop and maintain a strong and clear lead in 
market share over all other competitors for a prolonged period of time” (2003: 199).  
Along the same lines, scholars of VCs’ financing decisions (Shepherd, 1999) have shown 
that VCs use the variable “lead time” (an extended period of monopoly for the first 
entrant prior to competitors entering the industry) as one of their topmost investment 
criteria.    
 I suggest, however, that VCs use the criterion of sector dominance with some 
qualifications.  A venture expected to seize dominance in its sector will only interest a 
VC if it operates in a sufficiently large and rapidly growing sector.  Prior studies (Tyebjee 
& Bruno, 1984; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Muzyka et al., 1996) have shown that VCs 
assess the quality of the market (“market attractiveness”).  Hence, as part of their effort to 
measure the extent of business plan uncertainty, VCs would examine whether a venture is 
expected to achieve sector dominance in a sufficiently large and rapidly growing 
marketplace.  
 To sum up, it is important for VCs to evaluate the following variables related to a 
venture’s business plan: “product-market strategy,” “business model,” and “sector 
dominance” that is expected to be obtained soon in a relatively large and rapidly growing 
marketplace. 
Management Related Investment Criteria 
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 Prior studies have shown that VCs often emphasize quality of management as the 
most important (or at least an absolutely essential) investment criterion (Wells, 1974; 
MacMillan et al., 1985).  Specifically, prior scholars have examined the importance of 
management skills and experience (Wells, 1974, Poindexter, 1974, Robinson, 1987); 
management commitment (Well, 1974); management equity stake in the venture 
(Poindexter, 1976; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984); management creativity (Khan, 1987); 
management leadership potential (Muzyka et al., 1996); and management attention to 
detail (Kumar, 2003). 
 It appears, on the one hand, that some of the management-related criteria (for 
instance, attention to detail or risk tolerance) identified in the literature could be merely 
an aspect of a broader, all-inclusive criterion such as management competence.  On the 
other hand, some other important management-related criteria (for instance, management 
creativity and flexibility) may point to a somewhat different and even separate aspect of 
management. 
 Prior researchers have demonstrated that VCs extensively evaluate management 
education, track record, and background (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Muzyka et al. 1996).  
However, VCs are also known for investing in recent college graduates (or even college 
dropouts) who do not have any formal credentials but are nevertheless extremely 
qualified.  At the end of the day, VCs are interested in whether entrepreneurs whose 
ventures they consider for financing have adequate knowledge and understanding of their 
sector. 
 VCs also evaluate whether the entrepreneur(s) has assembled a viable team of 
like-minded and well-suited people who will be able to work together under considerable 
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strain for years to come.  Prior scholars have shown that as part of their due diligence 
VCs examine whether the founder(s) of a venture have recruited quality people into their 
team (Robinson, 1987, Muzyka et al., 1996).  
 The strategy literature (Sanchez, 1995, Hitt et al., 1998, Zhang, 2005) heavily 
emphasizes the role of strategic flexibility as an all-important characteristic of business 
leaders.  Shimizu and Hitt (2003) define strategic flexibility as an “ability to recognize 
problems and reverse resource commitments in a timely fashion when the initial action 
and resource commitments turn out to be unsuccessful” (2003: 45).  Since new ventures 
operate in rapidly changing markets VCs are likely to view flexibility as one of the most 
important management characteristics.  However, flexibility as merely readiness to 
change previously made decisions may not be sufficient.  Khan (1986) pointed out that 
VCs especially value management capable of delivering ingenious solutions to detected 
problems. 
 In addition, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) showed the importance of a timely and 
reliable stream of information imparted by management to VCs as a factor that buttresses 
the VC-entrepreneur relationship.  Even though it is possible to evaluate separately these 
three management attributes – flexibility, creativity and trustworthiness – they are likely 
to be evaluated by VCs in an integrative fashion.  Essentially, VCs could be asking 
themselves: can we trust this management (are they trustworthy?) to be able to adjust to 
the changing marketplace (are they flexible?) and exhibit ingenuity in doing so (are they 
creative?).  
 To summarize, I propose that while prior research has identified numerous 
management attributes that VCs may assess as part of their examination of entrepreneurs’ 
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business proposals many of these attributes could, in fact, be redundant.  Essentially, VCs 
focus on assessing a venture’s management by posing three questions.  First, does the 
management possess a superior knowledge and understanding of its sector?  Second, has 
the management assembled a group of top-quality people that can work well as a team?  
Third, can the management be trusted to provide a reliable stream of information 
regarding a venture’s progress and be able to adjust in a creative fashion to the changing 
marketplace?  
Customer Related Investment Criteria 
 Any business plan begins with a characterization of a venture’s offering - product 
or service.  However, VC firms are not solely interested in whether a venture has an 
excellent or even unique product.  VCs are also seeking to make sure that the senior 
management of a venture has a good understanding of its customers, and that the 
customer will actually endorse a product in a relatively short period of time to justify the 
investment. 
 A great product that does not satisfy an existing market need (or satisfies the need 
of a very limited and unprofitable market) will not interest a VC.  This is why VC firms 
emphasize that entrepreneurs need to understand their prospective customers (Roberts & 
Barley, 2004).  The VC firm Highland explains to entrepreneurs on its website that they 
need to describe their product from a potential customer’s perspective: “Frequently, the 
most successful companies are started by frustrated customers. The product discussion 
should explain the product and its benefits from a customer's perspective, not from the 
designer's.”  
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 Unfortunately, only a few studies of VCs’ investment criteria have brought 
attention to the fact that VCs separately evaluate (as part of their due diligence) how the 
customer will react to the introduction of a venture’s product (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989, 
Silva, 2004).  In contrast, the strategy and finance literatures have developed various 
measures of the customer’s perspective as one of the most important tools in company 
valuation.   
 Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996) first introduced a balanced scorecard for 
evaluating companies’ performance.  The balanced scorecard includes four perspectives: 
financial, internal, customer, and innovative.  Evaluating “how customers see us” allows 
focusing on operational strategies that firms often disregard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).  
Currently, over 50% of Fortune 1000 companies use a balanced scorecard (BSC) whereas 
very few small businesses apply that tool (Gumbus & Lussier, 2006).  VCs also routinely 
recommend entrepreneurs that they need to evaluate their product from a customer’s 
perspective (Robert & Barley, 2005). 
 I propose that VCs investigate three most important customer related variables.  
First, VCs want to make sure that the management of a venture pays attention to the 
customer, identifies the customer’s concerns, and is able to quickly readjust its approach 
in response to the feedback coming from the customer.  Second, VCs assess the timing of 
the customer’s expected endorsement of a new product.  Many VCs insist on a 
“scalability” of their investment: a limited investment should be sufficient for securing a 
high level of profitability.  Before they invest VCs assess how many customers will be 
likely to order the product in sufficient quantities within a certain time frame (Roberts & 
Barley, 2004).   
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 Finally, I propose that VCs evaluate whether an open market space exists for a 
venture’s product.  If the market is not sufficiently open (a quasi-monopoly such as 
Microsoft has locked most customers into exclusive contracts) it may be hard for a new 
venture to become profitable even if it offers a superior product compared to its rivals.  
To sum up, I hypothesize that VCs assess a venture’s quality of customer management; 
the timing and magnitude of customer product endorsement as well as the degree of 
openness in the marketplace as part of their evaluation of a venture’s customer-related 
variables. 
Competitor Related Investment Criteria 
 Prior research (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985, 1987; Hisrich & 
Fried, 1994) has established that VCs assess the degree of competitive threat following a 
venture’s entry as part of their screening and evaluating entrepreneurs’ business 
proposals.  However, previous scholars have not distinguished among various types of 
competitive responses to a new entry, and have not examined whether a VC’s appraisal 
of expected competitive responses to a new entry impacts the likelihood of a VC’s 
investment.   
 In contrast, the strategy literature has developed an elaborate theory of 
competitive dynamics (Chen, Smith, Grimm, 1992; Ferrier & Smith, 1999; Grimm, Lee, 
Smith, 2005) that discriminates among miscellaneous types of competitive actions and 
reactions. Thus, strategy studies (Chen, 1996) have established that competitors are more 
likely to respond to a competitive move (like a new entry) if they are sufficiently aware 
of the emergence of a new competitor; if they are able to respond; and if they are 
motivated to do so.  Awareness, ability, and motivation as well as a variety of other 
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factors, for instance, the intensity of a competitive move (Grimm, Lee & Smith, 2006) 
determine whether competitors will immediately respond to a new entry or delay their 
response.  
 Applying a theory of competitive dynamics to VCs’ evaluation of entrepreneurs’ 
business proposals, it appears that VCs should examine four main aspects of competitor 
uncertainty.  First, VCs may assess the likelihood of a delayed response to a new entry.  
Such delayed response would enhance a venture’s chances of survival, and, hence, make 
VCs more willing to invest in a venture.  Second, VCs may estimate a possible harm to a 
new venture as a result of competitor retaliation.  Eventually, competitors are likely to 
respond to a new entry, and VCs will need to examine whether a venture would be able to 
survive a vigorous reprisal from an entrenched competitor.  VCs will be less likely to 
invest if (based on competitors’ reputation) they foresee a strong retaliation (such as price 
war). 
 Third, VCs must consider whether competitors will be able to respond given their 
circumstances.  A competitor may be less likely to take action if it experiences serious 
problems, and does not possess the requisite resources for launching an attack (Chen & 
MacMillan, 1992).  A VC will be more likely to invest in a new venture if it believes that 
the competitors already operating in the target market cannot afford to attack a new 
entrant. 
 Fourth, competitive responses to a venture’s entry may represent an opportunity.  
The strategy literature has extensively researched the subject of strategic alliances among 
industry competitors (Child & Faulkner, 1998; Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003).  In 
addition, the strategy literature has established that competitors may use strategic 
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alliances to gain more information about entrepreneurial ventures regarded as promising 
acquisition targets (Kale et al., 2002).  When an entrenched competitor is more likely to 
offer a venture to collaborate (than to launch an attack) this increases a venture’s chances 
of survival.  If a VC establishes that competitors will be interested in building a strategic 
alliance with a venture (with an eye to an acquisition) a VC will be likely to invest in a 
venture. 
 To sum up, the strategy literature has differentiated among various types of 
competitive responses to a new entry, and has examined their potential effect on a 
venture’s survival.  Previous studies of VCs’ investment criteria have not utilized the 
concepts developed in the strategic theory of competitive dynamics.  In this dissertation, I 
propose that as part of their due diligence VCs analyze how different competitive 
responses will affect a venture’s situation, and posit that such appraisals affect the 
likelihood of a VC’s investment.   
 Therefore, VCs will assess four types of competitive responses as part of their 
examination of expected competitor reactions: 1/ the likelihood of competitors’ delayed 
response; 2/ the likelihood of competitors’ eventual retaliation; 3/ the likelihood of 
competitors’ nonresponse due to their own problems; and 4/ the likelihood of competitor 
collaboration.  
VCs’ Financing Decisions at the Pre-Investment vs. Post-Investment Stage 
 VC firms frequently provide subsequent rounds of financing to their portfolio 
companies (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Dean & Guglierano, 1990).  At times, ventures 
find it difficult, though, to obtain a follow-on financing.  This is because some VC firms 
may provide initial financing but not subsequent rounds of financing.  VC firms can also 
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prefer to invest in new ventures rather than to provide more financing to their portfolio 
companies (Dean & Guglierano, 1990). 
 Nevertheless, VC firms by and large offer subsequent financing to their portfolio 
companies, and need to assess whether further investment is justified.  One study has 
shown that VCs assess follow-on investments differently than they assess initial 
investments (Dean & Guglierano, 1990).  At the follow-on stage, VCs may be more 
interested in evaluating a portfolio company’s performance than its management’s 
qualifications (Dean & Guglierano, 1990).  Another study (Steier & Greenwood, 1995) 
showed the difficulties that a venture may face in obtaining additional financing from its 
VCs. 
 In contrast, other researchers (Ryan, 1998; Guler, 2003; Birmingham et al., 2004) 
have argued that VCs overcommit to their ventures and continue investing despite the 
mounting negative feedback regarding their portfolio companies’ performance.  Overall, 
these scholars have hypothesized that VCs’ behavior can be explained as escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1976). 
The Principal Hypothesis 
 In this study, I examine whether VCs are more likely to provide a venture with 
additional than initial financing.  I propose that VCs will interpret the same positive 
information at the post-investment stage more positively compared to the pre-investment 
stage and, consequently, will be more likely to invest in a venture (on the basis of the 
same positive information) at the post-investment stage compared to the pre-investment 
stage.   
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 Why would VCs interpret the same positive information more positively at the 
post-investment stage than at the pre-investment stage?  The most important reason is 
that VCs will generally have more background knowledge (more familiarity with the 
venture, and its environment) at the post-investment stage than at the pre-investment 
stage.  
 At the pre-investment stage, VCs seek to evaluate a venture’s business plan, get to 
know its management, assess whether a venture’s product will satisfy customers’ need, 
assess whether customers will be likely to start buying soon after the product becomes 
available, and assess how competition may react to a new venture’s entry into the market.  
Although VCs continue to evaluate these factors at the post-investment stage they will 
have considerably more contextual knowledge to establish whether some positive 
information regarding the venture is accurate.  This is why VCs may value positive 
information higher at the post-investment stage than they value it at the pre-investment 
stage. 
The Principal Hypothesis: Because of their growing contextual knowledge and familiarity 
with the venture, VCs will be more likely to evaluate the same positive information more 
positively at the post-investment stage compared to the pre-investment stage; hence, VCs 
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CUSTOMER HAS MARKET POWER TO MAKE 
PRODUCT ADOPTION DECISIONS 
Will customers be able to make their own product 
adoption decisions since they are not locked into 
contracts with other suppliers? 
CUSTOMER PROMPT PRODUCT 
ENDORSEMENT 
Will customers quickly embrace the venture’s product?
CUSTOMER CONCERN MANAGEMENT: 










investment criteria: COMPETITOR NONRESPONSE DUE TO OWN 
PROBLEMS: 
Will competitors fail to respond due to a venture’s 
entry due to their own problems? 
COMPETITOR RETALIATION EXPECTED 
Will competitors eventually retaliate to the venture’s 
entry? 
COMPETITOR DELAYED RESPONSE: 




Will competitors offer a venture to collaborate instead 








uncertainty using the 
following investment 
criteria:
GREAT MANAGEMENT TEAM: 
Have the founders assembled a top-quality management 
Team? 
MANAGEMENT SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE AND 
UNDERSTANDING OF ITS SECTOR 
Will the management exhibit superior competence and 
expertise? 
MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY, CREATIVITY 
AND TRUSTWORTHINESS: 
Will the management provide reliable information and 
creatively adapt to the changing marketplace? 




VCs assess business 
plan uncertainty 
using the following 
investment criteria: 
SUPERIOR BUSINESS MODEL 
Will a venture use a superior sales approach and 
configuration of distribution channels compared to 
the incumbents? 
WINNING PRODUCT-MARKET STRATEGY 
Will a venture successfully position its product in a 
fitting sector vis-à-vis competitors’ offerings? 
SECTOR DOMINANCE: 
Will a venture seize dominance in a sufficiently large 
and rapidly growing market? 
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD 
Data Collection and Sample 
 I used three approaches to contact venture capitalists for interviews.  First, I was 
able to utilize the extensive network connections of a former director of the Dingman 
Center for Entrepreneurship at the University of Maryland who had worked for many 
years as a general partner at a well-known VC firm.  He was also active for a long time at 
the Mid-Atlantic Venture Capital Association (MAVA).  I was lucky enough to receive 
extensive help from that scholar and practitioner with my research.  He also volunteered 
to introduce me to fifty VCs he knew personally, and ask them to meet with me for an 
interview. 
   From February of 2006 through June of 2006, the former director of the Dingman 
Center for Entrepreneurship has sent fifty emails to his colleagues at forty VC firms 
asking them for an interview.  The emails have targeted VC firms associated with the 
MAVA, and listed on the MAVA website.  25 VCs have agreed.  The response rate was 
50%.   
 Second, I have contacted an elected official at the National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA), and asked if he could recommend me some VCs who frequently 
write themselves (or give talks) on the subject of VCs’ investments.  He has advised me 
to contact ten prominent whose firms are located in Silicon Valley and in New England.  
I contacted all 10, and 8 out of 10 VCs agreed to an interview. The response rate was 
80%.   
 Third, I have sent 20 emails to other VCs listed on the MAVA website that the 
former Director of the Dingman Center for Entrepreneurship did not know personally, 
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and, hence, could not contact directly.  Seven VCs have agreed to an interview (a 
response rate of 30%).  In all, I have conducted 40 interviews; the aggregate response rate 
was 50%. 
 The VC firms I have interviewed are diverse in terms of their preferred stages of 
investment (half of the sample are early-stage investors, and half of the sample are late-
stage investors); sectors they habitually target for investment (there are three main groups 
of VCs in the sample – VCs funding bio sciences companies; VCs funding high-
technology  companies, and VC funding communications companies); age; capital under 
management and reputation in the VC community (some of the VC firms in the sample 
are startups while others have been listed among the top twenty-nine VC firms in the 
USA (Hardymon et al., 2006).  I have obtained an average capital under management for 
all the VC firms ($472 million) and all the U.S.-based VC forms ($620 million) listed in 
Venture Xpert, a Thompson Financial database.  The average capital under management 
in my sample is $1389 million.  Due to the presence of an outlier, a very large VC firm 
included in the database, and a small sample size, the mean was higher than either the 
overall or U.S. average.  
 I have conducted a one-sample t test to verify whether the mean capital under 
management in my sample ($1389 million) was significantly different from the mean 
capital under management of all VC firms ($472 million) and all U.S.-based VC firms 
($620 million) respectively.  The results have shown that the difference between the 
mean in my sample and the mean of all the VC firms was not significant (t = .9006).  The 
difference between the mean in my sample and the mean of the U.S.-based VC firms was 
also not significant (t = .7552).  This indicates that my sample can be regarded as 
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representative (in terms of capital under management) compared to the population of all 
VC firms and all U.S.-based VC firms. 
Operationalization of the Variables 
 To operationalize the thirteen variables (representing VCs’ investment criteria and 
organized into four thematic groups), I asked the respondents to assess them on a 100-
percent scale.  The interview commenced with the following passage I read to all the 
respondents: 
Suppose you are faced with a venture that you are 50% likely to finance and 50% 
likely not to finance.  What is the likelihood that you will decide to invest in a venture 
provided that you have just obtained some additional information which changed your 
beliefs regarding the venture in the following way…? 
 The survey has two almost identical sections.  In the first part of the survey, the 
respondents assessed the likelihood that they will initially invest in a venture.  In the 
second part of the survey, the respondents assessed the likelihood that they will continue 
investing in a venture.  The only difference between the questions in the first and second 
sections of the survey is that the questions in the second section state that the respondents 
know the respective information from their experience of overseeing the venture in 
question. 
 For instance, in the first part of the interview I have rendered to the respondents 
the following information: “you now believe that the senior management recognizes 
the concerns that the customer may develop about the venture’s product or service and 
proposes some reasonable tactics that will help in allaying such potential customer 
concerns.”   
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 In the third part of the interview, I have rendered to the respondents similar 
information: “you now believe that the senior management has early recognized some 
concerns that the customer initially developed about the venture’s product or service 
and has proposed some reasonable tactics that helped in allaying the customer’s initial 
concerns.”  The only difference between the ways the information is conveyed in these 
two questions is that the events described in the first question are merely hypothetical 
(they have not happened yet) while the events in the second questions have already 
occurred. 
 There are, of course, some significant changes that might occur at the post-
investment stage compared to the pre-investment stage.  First, a VC fund that has 
invested in a particular venture will be closer to liquidation and, hence, VCs may be 
reluctant to invest in new companies.  Under this circumstance, VCs could be biased 
toward continuing with a follow-on investment.  Thus, it will be more likely that a VC 
will provide its portfolio company with additional financing than finance some other 
venture. 
 Second, a VC firm may also use somewhat different strategies for screening 
ventures for follow-on financing compared to initial financing.  Although most VCs I 
have interviewed asserted that they use the same criteria at both stages, some VC firms 
still may be using different procedures at the pre-investment and post-investment 
stage.  Third, the political, economic and financial context may change from one stage 
to another.  Thus, if VCs have decided to finance a venture during a hot market, and 
are now trying to determine whether to provide it with additional financing during a 
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cold market, they may be more likely to continue financing a venture than seek a new 
investment. 
 While such considerations are valid, I have specifically instructed the respondents 
that the only difference between the two compared stages has to do with VCs’ increased 





















CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 The descriptive statistics are offered in Table 3.  The correlations among the 
reported variables indicate that the 13 investment criteria are not strongly correlated with 
one another along the lines of the suggested thematic groups: business plan related 
variables, management related variables, customer related variables and competitor 
related variables.  To establish how these variables are actually associated I ran a factor 
analysis. 
 Factor analysis 
 The actual factor analysis is not reported.  Instead, a condensed interpretation of 
the results of factor analysis is presented in Figure 5. Because of my small sample size 
(40 VCs), the factor analysis may not be reliable and therefore will only be used as one 
guide to condense the data set.   
 I found that the thirteen variables introduced in Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
(representing VCs’ investment criteria) load on seven factors rather than on four factors.  
Hence, the initial thematic classification of variables (business plan variables, 
management variables, customer related variables and competitor related uncertainty) 
does not correspond with how VC apply their investment criteria. 
 Two business plan related variables (“winning product-market strategy” and 
“superior business model”), two management related variables (“management sector 
knowledge” and “great management team”) and one customer related variable (“customer 
concern management”) all loaded on the first factor.  Hence, while it is possible to 
classify these variables thematically VCs actually conceive of these five variables as one 
factor.   
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 This first factor can be described as “strategy formulation and execution module.”  
Apparently, VCs are seeking to establish not only whether a venture has a winning 
product market strategy and a superior business model but also whether the management 
has the requisite qualifications and capabilities to execute the strategy both in terms of 
internal coordination (can they really work as a team?) and ability to manage the 
customer. 
 Two variables – one customer related (“customer market power to make product 
adoption decisions”) and the other competitor related (“competitor collaboration 
expected”) - load on the second factor.  These two variables are meaningfully related to 
each other.  The variable “customer market power to make product adoption decisions” 
points to the relative ease of access and operation in the marketplace.  The variable 
“competitor collaboration expected” indicates that the competitor prefers to exchange 
capabilities with a new venture rather than to forcefully attack it.  Hence, both variables 
point to the open market space module.  Customers that have the power to make their 
product adoption decisions and cooperative competitors signify an unrestricted market 
space. 
  Two variables load on the third factor.  The first variable is “competitor delayed 
nonresponse.”  The second variable is “customer prompt product endorsement.” Both 
variables describe the opportunities and threats that a new entrant could face in the 
marketplace.  Competitors that initially disregard venture (and give it time to strengthen), 




 “Management flexibility, creativity and trustworthiness” is the only variable that 
has loaded on the fourth factor.  This can be explained by that the variable specifies 
whether a venture’s management will be able to adjust to the changing market conditions 
in a creative fashion, honestly report all the information to its investors, and is able to 
reverse its prior decisions if they turn out to be incorrect.  No wonder this factor stands 
somewhat apart for instance from the variables pertaining to the strategy formulation and 
execution module.  Essentially, it brings up the fact that some changes in a venture’s 
strategic direction may need to be undertaken later on, and thus relates to the “future 
adjustment module.” 
 The variable “competitor retaliation expected” loads on the fifth factor.  Tables 3 
and 4 indicate that this variable is rather weakly correlated with all the other variables in 
the dataset.  In fact, this is the only variable that conveys some negative information 
regarding the future.  Overall, the respective factor relates to the “competitive threat 
module.” 
 The variable “sector dominance” loads on the sixth factor.  It is weakly correlated 
with the other two variables that relate to business plan.  Overall, it appears that this 
variable points to a different factor that can be described as the “market share module.”  
In a large and rapidly growing marketplace, “sector dominance” is tantamount to 
profitability. 
 The variable “competitor nonresponse due to own problems” loads on the seventh 
factor.  Importantly, this variable has a dual meaning. On the one hand, it is closely 
related to the variable “competitor delayed response.”  A competitor that has its own 
problems (Chen et al., 1992) will be less likely to retaliate.  On the other hand, if 
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competitors face problems that could also indicate that the marketplace itself may be 




Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations: Pre-Investment Stage 
 
Variables  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Sector dominance 0.72 0.13             
2. Management flexibility 0.66 0.13 0.21            
3. Customer concern management 0.58 0.09 0.26 0.38*           
4. Competitor delayed response 0.53 0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.28          
5. Competitor retaliation expected 0.45 0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.25 -0.05         
6. Winning product-market strategy 0.63 0.12 0.46** 0.37* 0.59*** -0.22 0.10        
7. Customer prompt product 
endorsement 0.69 0.11 0.43** 0.42** 0.30 -0.30 0.13 0.64***       
8. Management sector knowledge 0.67 0.13 0.34* 0.28 0.54*** -0.10 0.09 0.62*** 0.38*      
9. Competitor nonresponse due to own 
problems 0.58 0.10 -0.05 0.15 -0.17 0.42** 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.04     
10. Customer market power to make 
product adoption decisions 0.57 0.08 0.13 0.30 0.09 0.31 -0.12 0.31 0.41* 0.11 0.33*    
11. Competitor collaboration expected 0.56 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.28 -0.10 0.394 0.31 0.33* 0.42** 0.61***   
12. Superior business model 0.66 0.12 0.31 0.28 0.57*** -0.03 0.23 0.75*** 0.51*** 0.82*** 0.31 0.23 0.43**  
13. Great management team 0.63 0.13 0.14 0.50*** 0.54*** -0.13 0.21 0.51*** 0.23 0.55*** 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.65*** 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 4.  Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlations: Post-Investment Stage 
 
Variables  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Sector dominance 0.77 0.12             
2. Management flexibility 0.70 0.14 0.23            
3. Customer concern 
management 0.62 0.15 0.23 0.6089***           
4. Competitor delayed 
response 0.61 0.13 0.36* 0.4203** 0.6111***          
5. Competitor retaliation 
expected 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.27 0.16 0.30         
6. Winning product-market 
strategy 0.73 0.13 0.3848* 0.6209*** 0.6472*** 0.6062*** 0.3603*        
7. Customer  prompt 
product endorsement 0.76 0.12 0.4915** 0.4838** 0.4758** 0.5383*** 0.24 0.785***       
8. Management sector 
knowledge 0.69 0.15 0.3795* 0.6667*** 0.511*** 0.6026*** 0.21 0.6771*** 0.64      
9. Competitor nonresponse 
due to own problems 0.62 0.13 0.346* 0.554*** 0.4856** 0.696*** 0.4206** 0.6381*** 0.54 0.6442***     
10. Customer  market 
power to make product 
adoption decisions 
0.57 0.09 0.10 0.4112** 0.03 0.10 0.4522** 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.31    
11. Competitor 
collaboration expected 0.62 0.12 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.3279* 0.24 0.3515* 0.45 0.3566* 0.3561* 0.4222**   
12. Superior business 
model 0.73 0.12 0.3791* 0.4974** 0.5472*** 0.6616*** 0.06 0.7112*** 0.72 0.6758*** 0.578*** -0.17 0.3305*  
13. Great management 
team 0.66 0.14 0.07 0.6498*** 0.4114** 0.5033*** 0.05 0.5171*** 0.45 0.6763*** 0.4323** 0.20 0.15 0.5297*** 
 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Management sector knowledge 
Superior business model 
Winning product-market strategy 
Great management team 
Customer concern management 
Customer has market power to 
make product adoption decisions 
Competitor collaboration expected 
Competitor initial nonresponse 
Customer prompt product 
endorsement 




Open market space module 
New entry module 
Competitive threat module 
Future adjustment module 
Market share module 
 
Strategy formulation and execution 
module 
Competitor nonresponse due to  
own problems 





The Principal Hypothesis Test 
 I utilized the results of factor analysis to test the principal hypothesis presented in 
this dissertation.  Thus, I averaged the means of the five variables pertaining to “strategy 
formulation and execution module” at the pre-investment and post-investment stage, and 
conducted a t test.  Respectively, I averaged the means of the two variables relating to 
“open market space module” and the two variables relating to “new entry module” at the 
pre-investment and post-investment stage, and conducted a t test.  I also conducted a t test 
of the four single-item variables each pertaining to a separate factor (“competitive threat 
module,” “future adjustment module,” “market share module” and “hidden market flaws 
module”). 
 The t tests showed that there was a significant difference between all these factors 
at the pre-investment and post-investment stage.  Thus, VCs evaluated the impact of all 
the seven factors on the likelihood of venture funding much higher at the post-investment 
stage.  This supports the principal hypothesis advanced in this dissertation that since VCs 
have more information and contextual knowledge of a venture and its environment at the 
post-investment stage compared to the pre-investment stage they will interpret the same 
positive information more positively at the post-investment stage than at the pre-
investment stage, and will be more likely to provide a venture with additional than initial 
funding. 
 Cronbach’s alpha of the first factor (“strategy formulation and execution 





























Factor 1:  Strategy formulation and implementation 
uncertainty: 
1. Winning product-market strategy.  
2. Superior business model 
3. Management has a superior knowledge and understanding of 
its sector. 
4. Great management team. 
5. Customer concern management 
 
.632 .685 -.053 .01 .099 .114 -5.36*** 
Factor 2:  Open market space uncertainty 
1. Customer market power to make product adoption decisions 
2. Competitor collaboration expected .565 .596 -.031 0.12 .072 .091 -2.52* 
Factor 3: New entry uncertainty 
1. Competitor delayed response 
2. Customer prompt product endorsement 
.613 .682 -.069 .018 .067 .112 -3.89*** 
Factor 4: Competitive threat uncertainty 
Competitor retaliation expected .452 .504 -.052 .017 .097 .105 -3.01** 
Factor 5: Future adjustment uncertainty 
Management flexibility, creativity and trustworthiness .663 .698 -.036 .016 .135 .145 -2.27* 
Factor 6: Market share uncertainty 
Sector dominance .722 .769 -.047 .017 .130 .115 -2.82** 
Factor 7: Hidden market flaws uncertainty 
Competitor nonresponse due to own problems .575 .624 -.049 .020 .103 .134 -2.41* 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
Factor 1: Average interitem correlation: 0.6145 (.5904)    
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.8885 (8782)
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 Initial research on VCs’ investment criteria (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Muzyka et al., 1996) has identified 
management-related investment criteria (management competence, track record, 
functional skills, commitment, balanced management team); market-related criteria 
(market size, market attractiveness, market growth rate; access to market); product- 
related investment criteria (product uniqueness, functional prototype; superior product); 
risk-related criteria (investment risk, competitor risk, management risk, inexperience risk, 
implementation risk, viability risk, exit risk) and finance-related investment criteria (deal, 
returns). 
 However, several groups of authors (Sandberg et al., 1988; Hall & Hofer, 1993; 
Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000) have pointed to the limitations of research based 
on VCs’ self-reports as leading to discovery of “espoused” criteria rather than “in use” 
criteria (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1998).  These researchers also called on colleagues to 
use theories derived from strategy and economics for understanding VCs’ decision 
making.   
 Responding to this call, I introduced a number of investment criteria based on 
broader strategic and economic approaches such as “the customer’s perspective” (Kaplan 
& Norton, 1996; 2006), “competitor delayed response” (Chen, Smith, Grimm, 1992); 
“competitor nonresponse (Chen & MacMillan, 1992);  “competitor retaliation” Ferrier & 
Smith, 1999; Smith, Grimm, Lee, 2006), and “competitor collaboration” (Child & 
Faulkner, 1998; Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003). 
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 Factor analysis showed that the classification of investment criteria into thematic 
groups utilized in this dissertation (business-plan related variables, management-related 
variables, customer-related variables and competitor-related variables) as well as in prior 
research (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; 1986) represents an 
oversimplification.   
 For instance, two business plan related variables (“winning product-market 
strategy” and “superior business model”), two management related variables 
(“management sector knowledge” and “great management team) and one customer-
related variable (“customer concern management”) were strongly correlated with each 
other (Table 3), and demonstrated both convergent and discriminant validity.  An 
important conclusion following from this is that VCs utilize their investment criteria in an 
integrative fashion.  All these five variables are essential for strategy formulation and 
execution, and this is why VCs conceive of this group of variables as constituting one 
factor.   
 The results of a t test comparing VCs’ ratings of the seven factors identified in 
this dissertation by means of factor analysis have demonstrated that there are some 
important differences between VCs’ decision to provide a venture with initial funding (at 
the pre-investment stage) and additional funding (at the post-investment stage).  In their 
interviews, most VCs have pointed out that they are more likely to reinvest than to invest 
in a company since they have more available information and contextual knowledge 
about its situation. 
 Some VCs, however, have also emphasized their emotional commitment to 
portfolio companies, and, hence, their unwillingness to deny them support even when the 
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performance is worse than expected.  This supports prior research (Ryan, 1998; Guler, 
2003; Birmingham et al., 2004) which has discovered that VCs may be prone to 
escalation of commitment. 
 Other VCs have explained the higher likelihood of reinvestment compared to the 
initial investment by how syndicate agreements are structured.  VCs that do not continue 
financing a company often see their initial investment diluted, and even become 
worthless.  This makes it harder for VCs to decline further participation in a venture’s 
financing. 
Limitations 
 One limitation of this thesis is that it relies on information reported by VCs.  
Previously, several scholars (Sandberg et al., 1986; Hall, 1989; Hall and Hofer, 1993) 
have criticized studies based on VCs’ self reports.  In this thesis, however, I sought to 
circumvent this limitation by asking VCs to asses the likelihood of their investment based 
on some new information they received after having completed the initial due diligence.  
This procedure forced VCs to compare their investment criteria to one another in terms of 
their incremental value.  Another limitation of this dissertation is that it utilized single 
items to evaluate several modules that have been uncovered by way of factor analysis.  
Future Research 
 Future research may begin with exploring the types of uncertainty revealed in this 
study with the help of factor analysis, and try to identify a larger number of investment 
criteria directly related to the respective modules.  That would allow overcoming the 





  The study has supported the principal hypothesis advanced in this dissertation 
that due to more available information and broader contextual knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding a venture VCs are more likely to assess the same positive 
information more positively at the post-investment stage than at pre-investment stage, 
and thus be more likely to provide a portfolio company with subsequent than initial 
financing. 
 Interviews with VCs conducted along with the survey of VCs’ investment criteria 
have established that in addition to more available information at the post-investment 
stage, escalation of commitment and the structure of syndicate agreements may play a 
















INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
Project Title 
The Primary Factors Influencing Venture Capitalists’ 
Reinvestment Decisions 
 
     
Why is this research being 
done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dmitry 
Khanin, a Doctoral Student at the University of Maryland, 
College Park.  I am inviting you to participate in this 
research project (part of my doctoral dissertation) because 
you are a venture capitalist or an entrepreneur who can 
help me with your professional knowledge of the venture 
capital industry and/or entrepreneurial ventures. The 
purpose of this research project is to examine what factors 
influence venture capitalists’ decisions to provide (or 
discontinue) financing of their portfolio companies.  




The procedures involve taking part in an interview. The 
interview will take approximately one hour.  I will come to 
your office and ask you a series of questions.  The questions 
are related to venture capitalists’ reinvestment decisions.  
Some sample questions are: 
What are the most valuable resources that an entrepreneur 
(venture capitalist) can bring to the table?   
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What are the more important considerations that may 
influence a VC’s decision to pull the plug on the company 
(or scale down its involvement with it)?  
What factors would make a VC decide to give the portfolio 
company more time (and/or funding) despite its 
unsatisfactory performance?  
What are some of the reasons that an entrepreneur may have 
second thoughts about its involvement with a particular 
venture firm, and start looking for ways of discontinuing that 
relationship? 







I will do my best to keep your personal information 
confidential.  To help protect your confidentiality, I will take 
the following steps: Within two days after I interview you, I 
will download the interview from a DVR (a digital voice 
recorder) to my office computer, and transcribe it.  After 
that, I will download both the audio file and the Word 
document with the transcribed interview on a CD, and bring 
the CD to the locked file cabinet in Dr. J. Robert Baum’s 
office. As soon as I do that, I will immediately erase the 
audio file both from the DVR and my office computer. I will 
also erase the Word document with the transcribed text of 
the interview from my office computer.  Only Professor 
Baum and I will have access to the CD. Five years after the 
last article based on this research is published all the files 
will be erased from the CD. 
 Also, to preserve your confidentiality, (1) your name will 
not be included on the surveys and other collected data; (2) a 
code will be placed on the survey and other collected data; 
(3) only through the use of an identification key, will I be 
able to link your survey to your identity; and (4) I alone will 
have access to the identification key.   
 If I write an article about this research project, your identity 
will be protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your 
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information may be shared with representatives of the 
University of Maryland, College Park or governmental 
authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if I am 





Project Title The Principal Factors Influencing Venture 
Capitalists’ Reinvestment Decisions 
What are the risks of this 
research? 
 
There may be some risks from participating in this 
research study. There is a potential risk that the 
relationship between a venture capitalist and its 
portfolio company can be damaged if some 
information revealed by one of the parties could be 
passed on to the other party.  Another possible risk 
would occur if interviewees’ competitors (or 
sensationalist journalists) got access to my files.  To 
guard from these hazards, I request that the 
interviewees not mention either their own names or 
names of their firms or their portfolio companies 
during the interview.  I will also ensure that I do not 
pass on information from one party to the other. My 
role in the interview process is restricted to asking 
questions.  Finally, all my files will be coded (and I 
alone will have access to the key identifying 





What are the benefits of this 
research?  
This research is not designed to help you personally, 
but the results may help the investigator learn more 
about how venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
assess their partners’ resources and capabilities and 
the possibility of a productive cooperation with each 
other.  I will inform the participants about the results 
of my research upon request. I hope that, in the 
future, other people might benefit from this study 
through improved understanding of how venture 
capitalists make reinvestment decisions, and how 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can make their 
relationship work. 
 
Do I have to be in this research? 
May I stop participating at any 
time?   
Your participation in this research is completely 
voluntary.  You may choose not to take part at all. 
You may also choose not to answer some or any 
questions.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If 
you decide not to participate in this study or if you 
stop participating at any time, you will not be 









This research is being conducted by Dmitry Khanin, 
a Doctoral Student in the Management & 
Organization Department of the R.H. Smith School 
of Business at the University of Maryland, College 
Park under the guidance of Dr. J Robert Baum, an 
Associate Professor in the Management & 
Organization Department of the R.H. Smith School 
of Business at the University of Maryland, College 
Park. If you have any questions about the research 
study itself, please contact J. Robert Baum, 
Department of Management & Organization, R.H. 
Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; 
Tel.: 301-405-3908; jrbaum@rhsmith.umd.edu  
If you have questions about your rights as a research 
subject or wish to report a research-related injury, 
please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 
20742;             
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-
0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the 
University of Maryland, College Park IRB 





Project Title The Principal Factors Influencing Venture Capitalists’ 
Reinvestment Decisions 
Statement of Age of Subject 
and Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that: you are at least 18 years 
of age; the research has been explained to you; your 
questions have been fully answered; and you freely and 
voluntarily choose to participate in this research 
project. 






Signature and Date 
[Please add name, signature, 
and date lines to the final page 
of your consent form] 














Part I. Initial Investment 
 Suppose you are faced with a venture that you are 50% likely to finance and 
50% likely not to finance.  What is the likelihood that you will decide to invest in a 
venture provided that you have just obtained some additional information which 
changed your beliefs regarding the venture in the following way? 
1/ you now believe in the venture’s ability to dominate its sector in the immediate 
future (the sector is sufficiently large and rapidly growing). 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 




3/ you now believe that the senior management recognizes the concerns that the 
customer may develop about the venture’s product or service and proposes some 





4/ you now believe that competitors will initially ignore the venture’s entry and, thus, 
give it enough time to grow. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
5/ you now believe that the competitors will eventually launch some retaliatory actions 




6/ you now believe that the venture has chosen a winning product-market strategy. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 




8/ you now believe that the venture’s senior management has a superior knowledge 





9/ you now believe that the competitors already operating in the sector are 
experiencing some serious problems, and may not represent a significant threat at least 
in the short-run. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
10/ you now believe that the customer is not locked into agreements with other 




11/ you now believe that the competitor operating in the sector will be interested in 
collaborating with the venture in the near future. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
12/ you now believe that the venture’s business concept is far superior to the business 
concepts of its incumbent competitors operating in the sector.  
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
13/ you now believe that the choice of the venture for financing is justified given what 





Part II.  Additional Considerations at the Initial Investment Stage 
Suppose you are faced with a venture that you are 50% likely to finance and 50% 
likely not to finance.  What is the likelihood that you will decide to invest in a venture 
provided that you just obtained some additional information which changed your 
beliefs in the following way? 
1/ you believe that the venture will become very successful if you will have a chance 
down the road to replace its senior management that may not be sufficiently qualified 
for running such a business. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
2/ you believe that the venture will become very successful if you will have a chance 
to change its strategic direction or significantly transform its business concept. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 




4/ you believe you could retain your role as the lead investor in financing the venture 





5/ as a potential co-investor, you trust the due diligence of the lead investor and would 
like to cooperate with the lead investor on this project  
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
Part III. Subsequent Rounds of Investment or Reinvestment 
Suppose you are faced with a venture to which you are 50% likely to provide and 50% 
likely not to provide additional financing.  What is the likelihood that you will decide 
to reinvest in a venture given that you have just obtained some additional information 
which changed your prior beliefs regarding the venture in the following way? 
1/ you now believe that the venture is likely to dominate its sector in the immediate 
future (the sector is sufficiently large and rapidly growing). 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
2/ you now believe that the senior management of the venture is flexible, creative and 






3/ you now believe that the senior management has early recognized some concerns 
that the customer has initially developed about the venture’s product or service and 




4/ you now believe that competitors will continue to ignore the venture’s existence for 
some time and, thus, will give it some more time to strengthen. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 














8/ you now believe that the venture’s senior management has a superior knowledge 
and understanding of its sector as shown by its recent actions.  
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
9/ you now believe that the competitors already operating in the sector are 
experiencing some serious problems, and may not represent a significant threat at least 
in the short-run. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
10/ you now believe that the customer has not become locked into agreements with 
other suppliers and can continue making its own decisions with regard to the adoption 
of the venture’s products. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
11/ you now believe that the competitor operating in the sector has expressed some 
genuine interest in collaborating with the venture. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
12/ you now believe that the venture’s business concept is far superior to the business 





13/ you now believe that the choice of the venture for financing is justified given what 
you have found out about the senior management’s ability to work together as a team. 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
Part IV. YOUR VC FIRM’S STRATEGIES 
1a. Some VC firms prefer to get deeply involved in management of their portfolio 
companies; others prefer to give the senior management more leeway.  On a scale 
from 0% (a hands-off investor) to 100% (a hands-on investor) where would you place 
your VC firm?  
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
How many times per month do you visit a portfolio company if you are the 
responsible partner and your firm is the (1b) lead investor _________ , (1c) coinvestor 
_________?   
How many times per month do you visit a portfolio company if you a senior partner 
and your firm is the (1d) lead investor __________, (1e) coinvestor _________? 
How many times per month do you talk on the phone with the portfolio company’s 
senior management if you are the responsible partner and your firm is the (1f) lead 
investor _________ , (1g) coinvestor ______?   
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How many times per month do you talk on the phone with the portfolio company’s 
senior management if you are a senior partner  and your firm is (1h) the lead investor 
_________ , (1i) coinvestor ______? 
2a. Some VC firms regard the decision criteria they use in deciding whether to invest 
(or reinvest) in a venture as nonnegotiable.  Others are likely to make trade-offs.  On a 
scale from 0% (the criteria we use are nonnegotiable) to 100% (all and any criteria can 
be adjusted depending on the circumstances) where would you place your VC firm?  
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
2b. In what percentage of cases, did you make the decision to invest in a venture even 




3a. Do you prefer to serve as the lead investor in the first round? In what percentage of 
syndicated ventures over the last five years have you lead in the first round? 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
3b. If you served as the lead investor in the first round, in what percentage of ventures 





3c. If you were not the lead investor in the first round, in what percentage of ventures 
were you also the lead investor in the second round? 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100% 
3d. If you make an initial investment of X dollars, what percentage of X do you put in 
reserve for future rounds? 
0% _5%_10%_15%_20%_25%_30%_35%_40%-45%-50%_55%_60%_65%% 
70%_75%_80%_85%_90%_95%_100%_ 200%_ 300%_ 400%_ 500% 
4a. On a scale from 0% to 100% where 0% signifies that no collaboration with co-
investors is desired (we are only looking for partners who will contribute sufficient 
funds) and 100% signifies that rich collaboration with co-investors is desired (we want 
our syndicate partners to play a significant role in the governance process) where would 




Part V. HYPOTHETICAL EXIT DECISIONS 
 Suppose there are two portfolio companies that you have initially regarded as 
being identical candidates for reinvestment.  Specifically, you were 50% likely to 
reinvest and 50% likely not to reinvest in either company. Then you obtained some 
additional information regarding the second company.  How would the following 
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information change the likelihood of your reinvestment in a venture provided that 
initially you were 50% likely to reinvest, and 50% likely not to reinvest. 
You consider the following actions with regard to the venture and you are empowered 
to implement any of these choices:  
a/ give the company more time to come up with better solutions to its problems;  
b/ replace the senior management;  
c/ change the strategic direction;  
d/ stop financing the company and stay on as a passive investor;  
e/ seek to sell the company or your stake in the company.  
What is the likelihood that you will choose one of these above-mentioned options 
given that you have discovered the following drawbacks? 
Va. Your portfolio company A seems to be hitting its targets.  However, its business 
concept appears less attractive than when you initially decided to invest, and you are 
having increasing doubts concerning the venture’s ability to seize a dominant position 
in its sector.  Assuming that you are empowered to make the changes listed below 
what is the likelihood that you will endorse them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. Continue financing, but replace the senior management 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 




4. Discontinue financing, and stay on as a passive investor. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
5. Discontinue financing, and seek to sell the company or your stake in it. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
Vb. Your portfolio company B has so far performed well but you believe that it could 
have performed much better had it not been for its senior management’s lack of 
flexibility and creativity. Assuming that you are empowered to make the changes 
listed below what is the likelihood that you will endorse them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. Continue financing, but replace the senior management 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
3. Continue financing but change the venture’s strategic direction 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
4. Discontinue financing, and remain a passive investor. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 




Vc. Your portfolio company C has experienced some problems, it has not reached its 
targets, and you believe that this happened because the business concept itself has 
turned out to be less attractive than the senior management and you have initially 
believed. To add insult to injury, the senior management has not been sufficiently 
flexible and creative which made the company C’s situation even more challenging. 
Assuming that you are empowered to make the changes listed below what is the 
likelihood that you will endorse them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. Continue financing, but replace the senior management 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
3. Continue financing but change the venture’s strategic direction 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
4. Discontinue financing, and remain a passive investor. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
5. Discontinue financing, and seek to sell the company or your stake in it. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
Vd. Your portfolio company D has failed to reach its targets, and you believe that the 
reason for its unsatisfactory performance is that the customer has developed some 
serious concerns as to whether it makes sense for them at the present stage to endorse 
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company D’s product or service.  Assuming that you are empowered to make the 
changes listed below what is the likelihood that you will endorse them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. Continue financing, but replace the senior management 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
3. Continue financing but change the venture’s strategic direction 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
4. Discontinue financing, and remain a passive investor. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
5. Discontinue financing, and seek to sell the company or your stake in it. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
Ve. Your portfolio company E has reached its milestones, but just recently the 
company E’s competition has embraced a much more aggressive strategy toward 
company E which, in your opinion, will undercut company E’s (and the entire 
sector’s) profitability in the future.  Assuming that you are empowered to make the 
changes listed below what is the likelihood that you will endorse them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 




3. Continue financing but change the venture’s strategic direction 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
4. Discontinue financing, and remain a passive investor. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
5. Discontinue financing, and seek to sell the company or your stake in it. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
V f.  Your portfolio company F has done well up to this point.  However, you believe 
that the customer has recently slowed its orders of the company E’s products due to 
some doubts it has developed about its performance characteristics.  At the same time, 
the competition has targeted the company’s sector which, in your estimation, will 
undercut its profitability for the years to come. Assuming that you are empowered 
listed below what is the likelihood that you will endorse one of them? 
1. Continue financing, and give the management more time to sort things out 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. Continue financing, but replace the senior management 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
3. Continue financing but change the venture’s strategic direction 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 




5. Discontinue financing, and seek to sell the company or your stake in it. 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
PART VI. ACTUAL EXIT DECISIONS 
During the last five years, what is the percentage of the following exit decisions that 
your venture capital firm has chosen? 
1.  the percentage of your portfolio companies that have exited via an IPO? 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
2. the percentage of portfolio companies that have been acquired (or merged) at an 
early stage of their operations? 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
3. the percentage of portfolio companies that have been acquired (or merged) at a late 
stage of their operations? 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
4. the percentage of portfolio companies that you stopped financing due to your 
concerns about their ability to achieve success in accordance with your guidelines? 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
5. the percentage of portfolio companies in which you were initially the lead investor, 




6. the percentage of portfolio companies in which you initially invested, but were later 
able to sell your stake to the senior management of the company? 
0%- 5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-100% 
7. the percentage of portfolio companies in which you initially invested, but were later 
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